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My commentary on Jerry Petersen’s paper has a simple structure: First, I will point
out themes in it that I appreciated and which I would have liked to see more
thoroughly developed. Secondly, I have some reservations, all of which can be
subsumed under one heading: I think Petersen advances over a front that is simply
too broad, and that his campaign would have gained force if he had focused on fewer
points of attack.
1. PSEUDO-DEDUCTIVE ECONOMICS
Petersen’s main target is what we might call pseudo-deductive economics, i.e., the
kind of economic theory or practice that posits one or a few axiomatic assumptions
and proceeds as if everything that happens in the economic sphere and everything
that ought to be done in the economy can be deduced from those axioms. They
include, as is well known, the idea that economic behavior is driven by agents’
attempts to maximize utility; that the marketplace, if left to itself, will automatically
ensure the optimal supply of goods and services at optimal prices; and, essentially
that this mechanism will automatically see to it that all individuals’ needs and
interests are optimally fulfilled.
The claim that the current economic crisis, as a whole or in part, ultimately
resulted from decision-makers’ unwarranted reliance on these doctrines is the point
of departure in Petersen’s paper, and in support of it he cites a statement by the
former head of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. I find Greenspan’s admission
deeply interesting, and I would have liked more substantiation of the idea that
decision-makers by their own admission used, or were seduced by, pseudodeductivist economic rhetoric in implementing or recommending disastrous
policies. That in itself would certainly deserve a paper or even a book.
2. ADAM SMITH: PSEUDO-DEDUCTIVISM AS ENGAGING RHETORICAL STRATEGY
Next, I am thrilled when Petersen points out that Adam Smith, who supposedly
fathered the classic pseudo-deductivist doctrines, was in fact a much more nuanced
or ambiguous thinker who took an “overtly rhetorical and less dogmatic approach in
his Wealth of Nations,” yet also “admired the use of first principles as a professor of
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rhetoric and advocated it to his students.” Petersen, interestingly, quotes Smith as
saying that it “gives us pleasure to see the phenomena which we reckoned the most
unaccountable, all deduced from some principle.” Again, a paper or a book might
build on this idea alone. And I would like it to tell us whether Smith the rhetorician
pointed to pseudo-deductivism as a powerful rhetorical strategy precisely because,
as he says, it gives “pleasure” (to the rhetor as well as to his audience, we might
add), while at the same time, as an economist, he had the sense to see that unallayed
deduction from “some principle” misrepresents the world? Petersen instructively
illustrates the apparent contradiction between deductivism and inductivism in
Smith. I would have liked Petersen to further explore the suggestion that Smith does
not just expound a bit of each, but that deductivism is to him merely and precisely a
rhetorical strategy; something like this seems to me to be indicated in Petersen’s
other quote from Smith, which states that the method using “first principles” is
“undoubtedly the most philosophical, and in every science, whether of Morals or
Natural Philosophy, etc., is vastly more ingenious, and for that reason more
engaging, than the other.” Notice the word “engaging.” Is this statement, as Petersen
has it, really a “glowing appraisal of Newton’s method” – or is it rather a rhetorical
assessment of the pseudo-deductive method’s enormous potential appeal to certain
minds, its capacity to “engage” and perhaps even to seduce? And is pseudodeductivism in fact Newton’s method? That question is one I will return to.
At any rate, we have here the seed of a hypothesis that might help explain
why pseudo-deductivism in a discipline like economics has held the sway that it has:
It holds a unique psychological appeal to those who expound it as well as to many of
those who hear it or read it. Promising projects for rhetoricians here would be, first,
to demonstrate through textual analysis that the “pleasure” derivable from
deductivist doctrines in fact explains much of their power to “engage” and hence to
persuade; second, to analyze the exact nature of this pleasure-yielding mechanism;
and then, to discuss what sorts of personalities and what sorts of disciplines, in what
sorts of situations, are in particular susceptible to this appeal.
3. SCIENCE AS INVENTION?
I also liked Petersen’s discussion of the Pluto’s exemplary demotion from planet
status. I accept this story as showing that definitions in science are, in Alan Gross’s
terms, inventions rather than discoveries: For example, scientists choose to define a
planet as an object that has certain properties including ‘roundness,’ and
furthermore they can and must decide, arbitrarily, how much of this vague property
the object must have to qualify as ‘round.’ In short, the idea of a planet is not an
immutable essence. Pluto refutes Plato.
But everything in science is not “invention” in the same sense as the
definition of a planet. Science is made of other things as well, for example,
observations. It is true that some observations are, as Petersen and Richard Rorty
would say, “fudged” in order to fit definitions or deductive theories, and some
observations are pure inventions – but some are not.
On the whole, I suspect that Petersen’s has chosen to proceed on an unduly
broad front in his campaign to show that science belongs to those “uses of language
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that persuade and construct a vision of reality.” An important reservation I have is
that Petersen cites Newton as the great model for pseudo-deductivist theories. This
may be true historically, but it is misleading to imply that Newton was a deductivist.
He did not set up his laws as axiomatic first principles and then deduce everything
from them. Newton was not Descartes. Newton’s laws are theories that he derived
from empirical observations. Notice that Smith talks about first principles of two
kinds: “primary, or proved.” Newton’s were not primary. They were simple
equations that accounted extremely well for a body of observations built up over
many decades. These included the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe’s meticulous
charting of planetary movements, which allowed Johannes Kepler, at enormous
effort, to theorize that planets move in ellipses, with the sun at one focus. Newton,
among many other seminal ideas, then proposed the law of universal gravity which
explains these movements with reference to a centripetal force – gravity - inversely
proportional to the square of the radius vector. He also showed that the same
principle, expressed in a simple equation, may explain a host of other observations.
The idea that one simple force, expressed in simple mathematical terms, may
ultimately explain all mechanical movements in the universe was, as we know,
intensely stimulating and engaging to subsequent scientists and intellectuals and
kindled their desire for explanatory laws of similarly engaging beauty and simplicity
in other areas of human knowledge. Stephen Toulmin and now Jerry Petersen have
pointed out how misguided and even disastrous this desire has been. But the fact
remains that Newton’s principle were not ‘first’ in the sense of being axioms; they
were based on countless previous observations and calculations, and it stood up as
compatible with countless subsequent ones. By contrast, the axioms of pseudodeductive economics can claim neither of these merits.
This difference also explains why Newton’s theories were eventually, in a
sense, falsified by relativity. They had never been “proved” because scientific
theories cannot be. They were seen to be brilliant approximations that hold under
most circumstances. By contrast, pseudo-deductive economics is treated by many of
its true believers as a self-sealing system immune to falsification. In their eyes,
nothing that has happened or could possibly happen will ever disprove it.
4. RHETORIC: LEGITIMATE, NECESSARY AND SEDUCTIVE
It is certainly useful to be reminded that there is rhetoric and persuasion in science,
and the study and criticism of it is fascinating and important. But I suggest we stop
short of defining rhetoric in science so broadly that rhetoric becomes all there is to
it. There is also observation, and there is deduction, as well as induction, abduction,
experimentation, intuition and a lot more. I suggest we adopt Perelman’s definition
rhetoric, which sees rhetoric as persuasion about issues where there is no access to
deductive or compelling proof. Empirical science has no access to prove its theories
deductively; and that is where rhetoric comes in. So rhetoric is necessary in science.
Some of it is useful, some of it illuminating, but some of it is seductive or downright
false. Scientific rhetoric may be most appealing and hence seductive, to some minds,
when someone pretends that deductive inference from axioms will work in a field
that appears otherwise intractable.
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This is what we have seen in pseudo-deductive economics, and that is a
reason why need analysts like Petersen to make us aware of it.
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